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CASENOTES
Retracting the Long Arm: World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson' and
Rush v. Savchuk 2 — Less than ten years after the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff 3 held
that the due process clause prevented state courts from exercising jurisdiction
over defendants who did not have some association with the forum state. 4
Specifically, the Pennoyer Court required that a defendant have some physical
connection with the state before that state's courts could act. 5 This requirement
could be met in either of two ways. First, jurisdiction would inure in any state
where the defendant was present to receive process. 5 Second, wherever a de-
fendant's property could be found, a state could attach it and render a judg-
ment against the defendant to the extent of its value.'
In the years following Pennoyer, however, revolutions in commerce and
transportation put increasing strain on the rigid requirement that either the
person or property of the defendant be present within a state before jurisdiction
could be exercised.° To accommodate the Pennoyer rule to new realities, several
legal fictions extended jurisdiction to persons and things not actually present in
the forum. For example, with the advent of the automobile, non-resident
motorists causing tortious injury were deemed to have consented to the state's
jurisdiction through the use of the state's highways. 9 Likewise, foreign corpora-
tions became subject to suit if they were "doing business" in the state.'°
Ultimately, the doctrine of Pennoyer gave way to a more flexible approach,
requiring only that a state have "minimum contacts" with both the defendant
and the subject of the litigation in order to exercise jurisdiction." Under this
approach, first announced in -International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 12 a requisite
' 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
444 U.S. 320 (1980).
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
4 Id. at 733.
5 Id. at 724.
6 Id.
" Id.
B See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
9 E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (sustaining jurisdiction over a non-
resident motorist, who caused tortious injury in the state but who was not present to receive proc-
ess, on the theory that he had consented to jurisdiction through his use of the highways).
J° E.g., Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 356-66 (1933) (sustaining in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a corporation "doing business" in the forum by holding that the corpora-
tion through its.activities implicitly had given its consent both to the jurisdiction. of the state
courts and to the appointment of the secretary of state as its agent to receive process). A third ex-
ample of a jurisdiction expanding legal fiction is Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 224 (1905) (sus-
taining quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching a debt owed to the defendant by a person present in
the forum on the theory that a debt travels with the debtor).
" See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (applying International Shoe to action in rem as well as actions in
personam),
i2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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contact existed if the defendant had a sufficient association with the forum to
make it reasonable and just for the court to entertain the suit.' 3
 The minimum
contacts rule involved a balancing test in which the adequacy of the relation-
ship between a defendant and the state was measured by weighing various fac-
tors that indicated the overall fairness of permitting state court jurisdiction.' 4 It
was a test that examined closely the reasonable expectations of the defendant.
In a close case factors that might come into play to determine whether the
defendant's relationship with the forum was adequate to support jurisdiction
included: the relative convenience or inconvenience to the defendant of having
to litigate before a foreign tribunal,'s the overall convenience of the forum for
all interested parties,' 6 and the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the
dispute.' 7 If examination of these issues suggested that jurisdiction was
reasonable and just, then there was no constitutional impediment to the state
court proceeding with the case." This test greatly extended the reach of state
judicial power. It allowed a state to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who
neither were present nor owned property in the state.°
Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court, however, appear to
restrict the scope of the minimum contacts test somewhat by shifting the focus
from fairness to considerations of interstate federalism." In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 2 ' and Rush v. Savchuk22
 the Court declared that even
where the exercise of jurisdiction is entirely fair, a state tribunal nevertheless
might lack the power to render a valid judgment." The Court indicated that in
order to insure an orderly administration of the laws it is essential that the
judicial power of the states not encroach excessively on the coextensive authori-
ty of sister states. 24 Complete reliance on the International Shoe test of fairness as
the measure of jurisdictional power, the Court suggested, often did not narrow
sufficiently the number of possible forums, and, therefore, left potential de-
fendants unable to predict where they might be subject to suit." To combat
this uncertainty, the Supreme Court indicated that before determining whether
a contact is adequate to make jurisdiction fair, lower courts should decide first
whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with our system of federal
13 Id. at 316. See also Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445
(1952).
14 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
" See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978).
16 See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
17 Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).
18 See id. at 91.
' 9 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 356 U.S. 220 (1957); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In response to this expansion of jurisdiction,
many states enacted "long arm" statutes, which specified various events and transactions that
would be regarded as contacts. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 632 (2d ed. 1977).
2° Sec text at notes 199.204 infra.
2 ' 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22
 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
23 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Rush v. Say-
chuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980).
24 444 U.S. at 293.
25 Id. at 293-94.
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government." That is, lower courts should initially determine whether the ex-
ercise of state power will unreasonably interfere with the interests of other
jurisdictions.
The establishment of this threshold inquiry is a significant departure from
the approach in previous minimum contacts cases. In earlier cases all factors
that were deemed relevant to a determination of the fairness of jurisdiction
were balanced against one another in order to reach a decision. Such a balanc-
ing generally involved weighing the interests of the forum and the plaintiff in
allowing jurisdiction against the inconvenience of the forum to the defendant."
In World-Wide and Rush, however, the need for order and predictability in a
federal system was singled out as the preeminent consideration in this balanc-
ing of interests." If this factor was not satisfied, all other inquiries became im-
material. Unless a defendant acted in a manner that had a direct and definite
impact within the forum state, jurisdiction was foreclosed. No longer could a
jurisdictional claim be rested upon an indirect effect within the forum along
with an assertion that jurisdiction was fair because of other factors.
This casenote will examine the shift made by the Court in World-Wide and
Rush. Toward this end, the casenote will first explore the evolution of the
minimum contacts rule from International Shoe to World-Wide and Rush.
Through this discussion it will be shown that the minimum contacts rule was
conceived as, and until recently continued to he, a rule of substantial breadth,
evaluating jurisdictional claims by balancing a variety of considerations to
determine whether jurisdiction was fair. Following this overview, the Court's
holdings in World-Wide and Rush will be examined. These cases, it will be
demonstrated, expose a significant narrowing of the minimum contacts rule by
placing greater emphasis on concerns of federalism at the expense of overall
fairness to the parties. Finally, it will be argued that this change in the rule is
unwise because in not balancing all of the relevant factors, it may lead to the
denial of jurisdiction under circumstances that may work a substantial hard-
ship against the plaintiff while not serving any interest of the defendant.
I. IN SEARCH OF FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE:
THE EVOLUTION OF A BALANCING TEST
The minimum contacts rule as originally propounded in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington stated simply "that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment ... he [must] have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend the `traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "29 In the course of the International Shoe opinion, the
Court offered no substantive definition of a minimum contact. Rather, it
stressed the need for flexibility in determining the adequacy of contacts in a
given case. 3° The quality and nature of the contacts were to be evaluated in
26 Id.
27 Id. at 292.
" Id. at 294.
" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 311, 316 (1945).
3° Id. at 319.
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relation to other factors indicating the overall fairness of proceeding in the
forum." Thus, while a state with utterly no relations with a defendant would
be barred absolutely from exercising its judicial power over that defendant, a
state with some minimal contact would have its jurisdictional authority deter-
mined by the overall fairness and reasonableness of permitting its courts to ad-
judicate the dispute." As a result, a minimal contact that sustained jurisdiction
in one case may, in a different factual and legal setting, fail to provide a fair
basis for allowing the court to proceed.
Exactly how considerations of fairness were to be balanced against the
quality of the contact, however, remained unclear after International Shoe.
Subsequent cases established a pattern. These cases showed that the Court was
willing to extend traditional concepts of jurisdiction considerably where it
believed the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable and fair." The breadth of
the balancing approach espoused in International Shoe and its progeny perhaps is
illustrated best in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 34 The jurisdictional
controversy in McGee arose out of a suit brought by the beneficiary of a life in-
surance policy against the insurance company. The defendant, International
Life Insurance Company, had refused to pay off the policy because it claimed
the insured had committed suicide. 35 The beneficiary filed suit in California,
her domicile, as well as the domicile of the deceased." International Life
responded by challenging the jurisdiction of the California courts. The com-
pany argued that as a Texas corporation with no offices or agents in California,
it had no cognizable ties with the forum. In fact, so far as the record showed,
this policy, which had been solicited through the mail pursuant to a rein-
surance agreement with the deceased's original insurer, was all the business In-
ternational Life had ever done in California." Nevertheless, the California
trial court held for the plaintiff on both the jurisdictional and substantive
issues."
When the case came before the United States Supreme Court, it upheld
the state court. 39 The Supreme Court concluded that the use of the mail to
solicit the policy in California, to deliver the contract there, and to receive
premiums from the insured, although a weak contact, nevertheless was suffi-
ciently strong so as not to offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.° In reaching this decision, the Court balanced a variety of factors.
With regard to those factors favoring jurisdiction, the Court focused on the
" Id.
32 Id. See also text at notes 11-19 supra.
" See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).
34 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
35 Id. at 222.
96 Id. at 221, 223.
37 Id. at 221-22.
38 Id, at 221.
38 Id. at 223. The case came before the Supreme Court as a result of the Texas courts'
refusal to enforce the judgment. Id. at 221.
40 Id. at 222-23.
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strong interests of both the plaintiff and California in having the claim ad-
judicated in California. 4 ' Particularly, the Court noted that in many cases
where claims were small, if the plaintiff did not have a local forum the costs of
litigation might preclude the plaintiff's pursuit of the action." In examining
factors that weighed against jurisdiction, the Court discounted any inconve-
nience to the defendant as a result of its being held amenable to suit in Califor-
nia." It deemed any possible hardship on the defendant to be inconsequential
because the due process requirements of notice and adequate time to prepare a
defense had been observed." Additionally, the Court rejected the defendant's
claims that jurisdiction could not be sustained fairly because the California
statute establishing jurisdiction was not enacted until after it had entered into
the insurance contract." Thus, in McGee although the contact between the
defendant and the forum was slight, jurisdiction was sustained because under
all the circumstances it was deemed to be fair at the time the litigation began.
Later in the same term, however, the Court considerably narrowed the
balancing test. In Hanson v. Denckla, 46 the Court in a 5-4 decision held that in
order to sustain jurisdiction it must be established that the defendant engaged
in some activity that the defendant reasonably should have recognized would
give the forum jurisdiction over the immediate dispute.'" Under Hanson,
therefore, the critical issue shifted from whether jurisdiction was fair at the time
the action was brought to whether jurisdiction was fair at the time the defend-
ant established contact with the forum. Specifically, jurisdiction would lie only
where the defendant had reason to believe that its behavior was exposing it to
the judicial power of the forum."
In Hanson, Iike McGee, the plaintiff argued that jurisdiction over non-
residents was permissible because of business transactions conducted by mail
between the defendants and persons residing in the forum." The Supreme
Court in Hanson, however, found that the due process clause prohibited juris-
diction. 5° The dispute in the case centered upon the validity of an inter vivos
trust established in Delaware at a time when the grantor was a Pennsylvania
domiciliary. 51 Subsequently, the grantor moved to Florida where she received
trust income and from time to time conducted trust business with the Delaware
trustees by mail. 52 When the grantor died the residuary legatees under her will
41 Id. at 223.
42 Id.
* 3 Id. at 224.
44
 Id.
" Id. Defendant argued that the statute impaired the obligation of contract, but the ma-
jority brushed this argument aside, observing that the statute was only "remedial, in the purest
sense of that term," and that it in no way impaired defendant's substantive rights. Id.
" 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 253.
" Id.
* 9 Id. at 250, 252.
5° Id. at 254-55.
" Id. at 238-40.
52 Id. at 238-39, 252.
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brought an action in the Florida courts seeking to have the Delaware trust
declared invalid so that the res would become part of the residuary estate."
Florida accepted jurisdiction and invalidated the trust. 54
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Florida courts on the
ground that there was no basis for jurisdiction." It held that although certain
contacts in this case were comparable to those in McGee," these contacts could
not support jurisdiction because they did not provide the defendants with
reasonable notice that their activities exposed them to Florida jurisdiction."
Such notice, deemed essential to meet due process requirements, could have
been achieved, the Court stated, either through stronger contacts between the
forum and the defendants," or through a showing that the state had a
"manifest interest" in adjudication of the dispute. 5
Although the Court asserted that Hanson was consistent with McGee, it
failed to harmonize completely certain aspects of the broad fairness inquiry
used in McGee with the narrower approach employed in Hanson. A subtle shift
in the contacts test of both timing and scope evidently had taken place. In
McGee the issue was whether at the time the action was instituted jurisdiction
could be maintained fairly. 6° In Hanson, the inquiry was narrowed. It focused
exclusively on whether the defendant could fairly expect to be exposing itself to
the jurisdiction of the forum at the time the alleged contact was established. 61
Despite this refinement of the issue in Hanson, the flexibility of the contacts
rule was not seriously impaired. State courts continued to assess jurisdictional
claims by balancing factors related to the overall fairness of litigating in the
forum, reasoning that this inquiry was a central consideration in determining
what the defendant's expectations should have been. For example, in Gray v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. , 62
 the Illinois Supreme Court sus-
tained jurisdiction over an Ohio defendant who had sold defective valves to a
Pennsylvania manufacturer of water heaters. The contact with the forum was
established because the water heater manufacturer in turn had sold a water
heater to an Illinois resident." When the water heater exploded, allegedly
because of the valves, the court ruled that an action against the valve manufac-
turer for injuries sustained by the purchaser could be maintained in Illinois
because it was foreseeable that a water heater containing the valves would be
sold in Illinois." Implicit in this decision is the Illinois court's conclusion that if
the defendant could foresee the use of its valves in Illinois, it reasonably should
53
 Id. at 240.
54 Id. at 242-43. The residuary legatees asserted that the grantor's exercise of her power of
appointment was ineffective and that the property therefore should pass to them. Id
55 Id. at 256.
56
 Id. at 253.
" Id.
'a Id.
59 Id. at 252.
6° See text at notes 39-45 supra.
61
 See text at notes 55-59 supra.
62 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
63 Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
64 Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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expect to be subject to suit there. Presumably, such an expectation would arise
because of the plaintiff's and Illinois's interest in having an Illinois forum
available.
Similarly, in Feathers v. McLucas, 65 a New York action, jurisdiction was
allowed where the defendant, a Kansas manufacturer of tank trailers, sold a
trailer to a Pennsylvania shipper and the trailer exploded in New York." The
court reasoned that because of the mobility of the product, it was foreseeable
that defendant's activities would cause harm in the forum. 67 Again, implicit in
this holding is the court's conclusion that the foreseeability of harm was suffi-
cient to raise the reasonable expectation of jurisdiction over the defendant.
Because the defendant recognized that the product might travel to a foreign
forum, it was also deemed to have recognized that it might be subject to suit in
a foreign forum, provided it was fair. Thus, even after Hanson state courts con-
tinued to exercise their jurisdictional powers expansively. 68
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has sought to curtail this liberal
reading of Hanson and has utilized the distinction between the McGee test, and
the Hanson test, to deny jurisdiction in certain cases. This effort by the Court
presaged the modified minimum contacts rule later espoused in World-Wide
and Rush. The landmark case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 69 in which the minimum con-
tacts approach was first applied to an action brought under a quasi in rem
theory, is a good example of this development."
Shaffer involved a shareholders' derivative action brought by a shareholder
of a Delaware corporation seeking to obtain jurisdiction over the directors of
the corporation in Delaware. Because none of the directors resided in Delaware
the plaintiff sought jurisdiction quasi in rem by sequestering the directors' stock
in the corporation, which under Delaware statute was deemed to be construc-
tively present in the state.n The Delaware courts accepted jurisdiction on this
basis." The defendant appealed this ruling to the United States Supreme
21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1964).
"n Id. at 558-59, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
67 Id. at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
" Kg., Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822-23 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied sub nom. Durell Prod., Inc. v. Ajax Realty Corp., 411 U.8. 966 (1973); Sheridan v. Cadet
Chem. Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 22-23, 195 A.2d 766, 768-69 (1963); Duignan v. A.H.
Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 136-37, 247 N.W.2d 375, 377-78(1977); Andersen v. National Presto
Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 918-19, 135 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1965); Ehlers v. United States
Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 61-62, 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963); Roy v.
North American Newspaper Alliance, Inc., 106 N.H. 92, 97-98, 205 A.2d 844, 847 (1964). Cf.
Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 258-59, 413 P.2d 732, 735-36 (1966)
(holding that Hanson did not even require that the defendant foresee that his action might have an
impact in the forum). See also Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 494-95, 500
(1971) (supporting, in dictum, jurisdiction where the defendant dumped pollutants in a stream
outside the forum, Ohio, but where through the action of the water the pollutants ultimately
caused damage in Ohio).
° 9 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7° An equally good example of this move by the Court is Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). For a brief description of Kulko, see note 138 infra.
7 ' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S .  186, 189-90 (1977).
72 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976).
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Court arguing that the minimum contacts rule should be applied to quasi in rem
actions, and that here the requisite contacts were lacking."
Recognizing the possibility that the Supreme Court might accept the
defendant's arguments and apply a contacts analysis, the plaintiff argued
before the Court that the defendants' acceptance of positions as officers and
directors of the corporation provided sufficient contact with the forum to make
jurisdiction fair. 74 This argument was based upon the assertion that Delaware
law conferred substantial benefits and responsibilities upon persons in top
management positions and that the state had a substantial interest in adjudicat-
ing disputes between the managers and shareholders of a Delaware corpora-
tion." Therefore, the plaintiff argued that the defendants, by assuming their
respective positions in the corporation, performed acts of such a nature and
quality as to have "purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State,"" and under Hanson submitted
themselves to Delaware jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court first decided that the minimum contacts rule applied
and that the constructive presence of the sequestered property in Delaware
alone did not provide the contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction. The
Court then proceeded to examine the alternative basis for jurisdiction urged by
by the plaintiff." It rejected plaintiff's assertion that the defendants' accep-
tance of positions as fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation was a purposeful act
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction." The Court determined that even if it were to
accept the plaintiff's entire argument, it could not permit Delaware to exercise
jurisdiction because the state interests described by the plaintiff were not suffi-
ciently obvious to put the defendants on notice that their acts subjected them to
jurisdiction."
The Court observed that the arguments presented by the plaintiff in favor
of granting jurisdiction rested upon the contention that there existed a strong
state interest in adjudicating claims against officers and directors of Delaware
corporations." The Delaware sequestration statute, through which plaintiff
was asserting jurisdiction, however, authorized jurisdiction only over
shareholders." Because directors need not be shareholders," the Court ques-
tioned whether Delaware had expressed a manifest interest in insuring jurisdic-
tion over officers and directors of its corporations." Nevertheless, even assum-
" Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 193 (1977).
74 Id. at 213-14.
" Id. at 214, 215-16.
76 Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
" Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
78 Id. at 213.
1° Id. at 215-16.
8° Id. at 216.
131
 Id. at 214.
82 Id.
" In Shaffer the plaintiff was able to obtain jurisdiction over only 21 of 28 present and
former officers and directors named as defendants because seven defendants owned no stock in
the corporation. Id. at 191-92, 214.
64
 Id. at 214.
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ing a substantial state interest, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to
show that jurisdiction was fair." The only factor the plaintiff offered in support
of allowing jurisdiction, aside from Delaware's interest in the litigation, was
defendants' acceptance of the benefits provided to corporate fiduciaries under
Delaware law. 86 This factor and Delaware's interest in the action, however,
were not sufficient to outweigh defendants' interest in avoiding suit in a forum
with which they had so little contact." These factors did not, in view of all the
circumstances, provide the defendants with a reasonable expectation that ac-
cepting a position with a Delaware corporation exposed them to suit in
Delaware. 88
If the Shaffer Court had utilized the contacts analysis developed in McGee,
examining overall fairness at the time the action was instituted, it seems likely
that it would have sustained jurisdiction. In Shaffer the principal obstacle to
Delaware jurisdiction was the lack of an express state interest in exercising
jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries." Because there was no clear interest,
the Court reasoned, the defendants reasonably could not recognize that their
acceptance of positions as officers and directors of a Delaware corporation sub-
jected them to Delaware jurisdiction."
In McGee, however, there was also no express state interest to put the
defendant on notice. No California statute or judicial decision notified it that
by soliciting a single reinsurance contract in California it was exposing itself to
the jurisdiction of that state." It was not until one year after the contract was
formed that California enacted the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act express-
ly establishing jurisdiction in cases like McGee. 92 This statute, therefore, did not
provide the defendant with notice at the time the act creating jurisdiction was
committed. In McGee, such notice was not necessary." It was only necessary
that jurisdiction be fair at the time the action was begun.
If this standard had been applied to Shaffer, the case for allowing jurisdic-
tion would have been strong. The Delaware statute provided the defendants in
Shaffer with more warning regarding the possibility of suit in the forum than the
California statute relied on in McGee. The Delaware statute at least provided
notice to defendants that the state could assert jurisdiction over a stockholder if
it could establish the constitutionally required contacts. The California act,
having been passed after the fact, did not even provide this much notice. In
McGee the lack of notice was outweighed by the forum's interest in providing its
residents with an effective means of redress against foreign insurers who refuse
to pay claims." The Court recognized that if the claimant were forced to
litigate in a distant forum, the added hardship, as a practical matter, might
85 Id. at 215.
86 Id. at 215-16.
87 Id. at 216.
80 Id.
89 See text at notes 79-85 supra.
90 id.
91 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 223.
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foreclose pursuit of the litigation." Similar problems confronted the plaintiff in
Shaffer. Because the directors and officers lived in a number of jurisdictions, 96 if
they all could not be sued together in Delaware, there may be no state forum
where a single action could be brought against all of the defendants." Under
McGee, Delaware's interest in the litigation seemingly would have overcome the
lack of notice. In Shaffer, however, it was not enough that the state's interest
outweighed the lack of notice." Under the Hanson approach the state's interest
actually had to provide notice to the defendants that in accepting a position as a
corporate fiduciary they were submitting themselves to Delaware
jurisdiction. 99
 On balance, the Shaffer Court concluded that Delaware's interest
in the case did not meet this test.'"
In reaching this conclusion, Shaffer seemed to apply the Hanson test more
strictly than had earlier cases, which allowed jurisdiction on the basis of the
forum's interest in the litigation.'°' Shaffer placed more weight on the defend-
ant's interest at the expense of the forum's interest, and as a result, jurisdiction
was denied. Shaffer did not obviously suggest, however, that a strong state in-
terest could never provide sufficient notice to overcome a weak contact.
It was not until World-Wide and Rush that the Court declared that a
forum's or a plaintiff's interest in allowing jurisdiction could never overcome a
weak contact. 10" In World-Wide and Rush the Court held that where a defendant
acted in a manner that he recognized might have an impact on a foreign forum,
the contact between the defendant and the forum was too weak to sustain
jurisdiction in that forum under any circumstances. 1 ° 3 To sustain jurisdiction,
the defendant must have committed an act that he reasonably should have
recognized would have an impact on the forum.'" Only where such a contact is
established should a court proceed to determine whether jurisdiction is fair.' 65
95
96 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 190-191 (1977).
" A shareholder still might be able to bring an action in federal court under the diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), but there are several potential problems with this ap-
proach. First, § 1332 requires that at least $10,000 be in controversy. Id. Second, there must be
complete diversity of citizenship; if the plaintiff and one of the defendants are from the same state,
§ 1332 does not apply. Id. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 37 (2d ed. 1977).
Finally, Congress is apparently seriously contemplating the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See
H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); 5.679, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
'a Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
Id. at 215-16 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958)).
'°° Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
ml See, e. g. , Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 432, 444,
176 N.E.2d 761, 767 (1961); Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551
(1964).
1 °' See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980).
"" Id.
1 °4 See text at notes 138 & 183 infra.
1
° 5 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 332-33.
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II. FEDERALISM OVER FAIRNESS: WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V.
WOODSON AND RUSH V. SAVCHUK
A. The Opinions of the Court
The jurisdictional dispute in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson arose
out of a product-liability action. In September 1977, while plaintiff Kay Robin-
son and her two children were driving through Oklahoma on the way from
their former residence in New York to a new home in Arizona, their car was
struck from the rear by another vehicle.'" The gasoline tank of the Robinsons'
Audi automobile ruptured causing a fire in the interior of the car.'" All three
passengers were severely burned.'" The Robinsons brought a product-liability
action against the car's manufacturer, Audi NSU auto Union Aldiengesellshaft
alleging that the injuries they suffered were the result of the defective design
and placement of the Audi's gasoline tank and fuel system.'" Additionally,
under Oklahoma law, which places distributors and retailers in the position of
the manufacturer, the plaintiffs joined the importer, Volkswagen of America,
Inc.; the regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation; and the
retail dealer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., as defendants."°
Two of the four defendants, World-Wide and Seaway, responded to the
suit by entering a special appearance."' They claimed that any attempt by the
Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction over them would violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Both corporations contended that
they had no dealings in or with the state that could constitute the "minimum
contacts" necessary to sustain in personam jurisdiction. " 2 Evidence presented to
the trial court showed that the Robinsons had purchased the car from Seaway
in 1976, one year before the accident." 3
 The sale took place in New York state,
where Seaway was incorporated and had its sole place of business and where
the Robinsons resided at the time." 4
 World-Wide, which supplied the Robin-
son's Audi to Seaway, also was incorporated in New York and had its offices
there, although it distributed vehicles, parts, and accessories to dealers in New
1 " World - Wide Volkswagen Corp, v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 288.
1 °' Id.
l08 Id.
109 Id.
110
 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 32, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
" 1
 444 U.S. at 288. Volkswagen of America also entered a special appearance in the
Oklahoma District Court, but did not pursue its jurisdictional defense in the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma. Id. at 288 n.3. Thus while Volkswagen of America and Audi are still defendants in
the case pending before the trial court, they were not parties to the jurisdictional dispute decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
A special appearance occurs when a defendant comes before the court solely to challenge the
power of the court to assert jurisdiction over his person. No other issues may be considered in a
special appearance. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 647-48 (2d ed. 1977).
" 2
 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 288-89.
113 Id. at 288.
14 Id. at 288-89.
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Jersey and Connecticut as well as New York.'" There was no showing that
either corporation had any business dealings in or tangentially related to
Oklahoma. In fact, with the sole exception of the plaintiff's car, there was no
evidence that any automobile sold by either World-Wide or Seway ever
entered Oklahoma." 6
The trial court, however, rejected World-Wide and Seaway's argument,
holding that the Oklahoma long-arm statute"' permitted the exercise of
jurisdiction and that the use of such authority would not be inconsistent with
the Federal Constitution." 8 Following this ruling, World-Wide and Seaway
petitioned the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for a writ of prohibition to prevent
respondent trial judge, Charles Woodson, from exercising jurisdiction over
them." 8 The Oklahoma high court denied the writ and sustained Judge Wood-
son's finding of jurisdiction. 120
In its opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concentrated on fitting the
facts of the case to the state long-arm statute and virtually ignored the indepen-
dent constitutional issue.' 2 ' The court concluded that jurisdiction may be exer-
cised under that portion of the long-arm statute that brings a person causing
tortious injury in Oklahoma within the purview of the state courts if that per-
" 5 Id
16 Id. at 289. It should also be noted that Seaway and World-Wide are independent cor-
porations. Their only relations with Volkswagen of America, Audi, or each other arc contrac-
tual. Id.
'" The portion of the Oklahoma long-arm statute upon which jurisdiction was based pro-
vides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by
agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's:
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he
regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of con-
duct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this state.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 1701.03(a)(4) (1980). See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction after
Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ.
L. REV. 861, 907-08(1978).
'I° World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289 (1980).
" 9 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 352 (Okla. 1978), rev'd,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
120 Id. at 355.
"' At the outset of its opinion the court acknowledged that in order to uphold a claim of
personal jurisdiction it must determine "whether the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by
statute, and,, if so, whether such exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the constitutional re-
quirements of due process." Id. at 352-53. Following this introductory pronouncement,
however, the court devoted the entire balance of the opinion to the statutory question alone.
There is no clearly distinguishable discussion of the constitutional limitations. In writing the
opinion for the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice White speculated that this omission
probably occurred because the relevant portion of the long arm statute previously had been inter-
preted as conferring jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the fourteenth amendment.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 290. See also Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 52 (Okla. 1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,
536 P.2d 897, 900 (Okla. 1975); Hines v. Glendenning, 465 P.2d 460, 462 (Okla. 1970).
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son derives substantial income from goods used in the state.'" The court rea-
soned that because of the cost of a single automobile and because of the
presence of the plaintiff's automobile in Oklahoma, it reasonably could be in-
ferred that the defendants derived substantial revenue from cars that were from
time to time operated in the state.' 23 The court also observed that due to the
mobility of the product involved, it was foreseeable that such products would
be used in Oklahoma, and hence, defendants reasonably could have expected
to be subject to suit there.'" Consequently, the court found no impediment to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over World-Wide and Seaway. 125
From this holding the Supreme Court of the United States granted cer-
torari to determine whether this interpretation of the Oklahoma long-arm
statute was consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 26 In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma and held that World-Wide and Seaway "have no
`contacts, ties or relations' with the State of Oklahoma" sufficient to support
constitutionally an assertion of personal jurisdiction.' 27 In reaching this deci-
sion, the majority opinion, written by Justice White,'" outlined the broad
principles involved in deciding the constitutional propriety of a state court's
decision to exercise jurisdiction, and then applied these principles to the facts of
the World- Wide case.
In reviewing the case law surrounding the minimum contacts rule, the
Court observed that the purpose of the restrictions imposed by the due process
clause and the minimum contacts rule is (1) to protect defendants from the
hardships of litigating in an inconvenient or inappropriate forum, and (2) to
ensure that state courts will not attempt to exercise their power so as to infringe
upon the sovereignty of other states.' 29 With respect to the first consideration,
the Court noted that defendant's interest in avoiding suit in an inappropriate
forum is not protected absolutely. It must be balanced against other interests,
such as the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's in-
122 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d at 354-55. For the text of that
portion of the long arm statute relied on by the court, see note 117 supra.
123 585 P.2d at 354.
12 + Id. Although the court failed to explain why it is important that the petitioners could
reasonably foresee the use of the automobile in Oklahoma, it must be presumed that this is a
reference to the constitutional requirement that the defendant have "reason to expect to be haled
before" the courts of that state. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 187, 216 (1977). See also, e.g., Kulko
v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978).
The court also rejected an argument that the state might assert jurisdiction under OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, $ 1701.03(a)(3) (1980), which provides for personal jurisdiction over persons
"causing tortious injury in this state by an act or ommission in this state . . ,"the court con-
cluding that it was not possible to construe the defendants' allegedly tortious acts or omissions as
having occurred in Oklahoma. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d at 353-54.
1 " 585 P.2d at 354-55.
1 " World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
127 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 299.
' 28 Id. at 287. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
129 Id. at 291-92.
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terest in obtaining convenient and satisfactory relief, shared interest in judicial
efficiency, and the furtherance of fundamental substantive social policies. 130 As
to the second factor, the Court saw the limitations placed upon state judicial
power by considerations of federalism as absolute. No countervailing factor
could alter its requirements."' Where a contact between the defendant and the
forum is weak, concern for the maintenance of a genuinely federal system of
government may foreclose jurisdiction irrespective of other fairness interests. 132
Applying this second factor to the facts of World-Wide,' 33 the Court found
that jurisdiction could not be sustained. Under the Court's interpretation of
the Oklahoma long-arm statute two types of contact, present here, might have
established jurisdiction: (1) tortious injury caused in Oklahoma by the defend-
ants through foreseeable circumstances,' 34
 or (2) substantial income accruing
to the defendant from activities in the forum. 135
 Both of these contacts, how-
ever, were rejected as too weak to serve as bases for jurisdiction under the due
process clause. 136
With respect to the first potential contact the Court held that foreseeability
of tortious injury alone was insufficient."' The defendants must purposefully
avail themselves of the forum's privileges.'" It is not enough that the defend-
ants' acts may have an impact on the forum. The defendants must have com-
mitted acts that they anticipated would have an effect on the forum.'" The
Court asserted that the orderly administration of the laws demanded a stricter
standard that would permit potential defendants to structure their behavior so
as to be able to avoid suit in a particular jurisdiction.'" The unilateral act of
the plaintiff in bringing goods sold by the defendant into the state, even when
l'° Id. at 292.
Id. at 294.
'" Id
1 " Id. at 295.
' 3' Id. at 295-96.
1 " Id. at 298.
16 Id. at 299.
1 " Id. at 297
1B Id,
139 Id The Court cited two cases in support of this proposition. In both cases, the court
asserted, the defendant could foresee the creation of the contact, but jurisdiction was nonetheless
denied. First, the Court cited Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), in which Florida was
denied jurisdiction over a Delaware trust and its trustees even though the grantor of the trust had
moved to Florida following the creation of the trust and from there she had exercised her power of
appointment. Id. at 254-55. Second, it referred to Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S.
84 (1978), in which a woman, after obtaining a divorce, moved from New York, the domicile of
the marriage, to California and attempted to obtain legal custody of her daughter through the
California courts. In Kulko the Court held that jurisdiction may not be obtained over the
woman's husband who remained in New York even though he had from time to time sent the
child to California to visit her mother. Id. at 101. These two cases, however, are not clear support
for the position taken by the Court. Up until World-Wide, Hanson was construed to allow jurisdic-
tion where the contact was foreseeable and jurisdiction was fair. See cases cited in note 68 .supra. In
Kulko, although the contact was foreseeable, the Court denied jurisdiction because it was not fair.
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978).
14° 444 U.S. at 297.
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combined with the defendants' ability to reasonably forsee that plaintiff would
do so, was not enough."'
As for the contention that jurisdiction can be sustained because World-
Wide and Seaway derive substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court both questioned the factual findings of the Oklahoma
courts and rejected their conclusions as to the law. With respect to the facts, the
Court found "less than compelling" the inference drawn by the state court that
because the Robinsons' automobile had been used in Oklahoma, the peti-
tioners' probably derived substantial income from other cars that operated in
the state. 142 Even accepting this inference, the Court held that whatever
revenue the defendants might have received because their cars could be driven
in Oklahoma was "far too attenuated a contact" to suport in personam jurisdic-
tion. 143 Having found no contact sufficient to sustain jurisdiction over World-
Wide and Seaway, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Oklahoma
court.'" The Court found it unnecessary to engage in a balancing of interests
to determine whether Oklahoma jurisdiction was consistent with due process
notions of fairness.' 45
The Court reached a similar result in Rush v. Savchuk, a case decided the
same day as World-Wide. Rush also arose out of a tort action involving an
automobile accident." 6 The jurisdictional issues involved, however, were
distinctly different. Rush concerned a single-car accident occurring on January
13, 1972, in the State of Indiana."' The plainiiff, Savchuk, was a passenger in
the car and sustained serious injuries. 148 At the time of the accident both Sav-
chuk and the driver of the car, defendant Rush, were residents of Indiana, as
was the owner of the car, Rush's father. 149 Nearly two and one half years after
the accident, Savchuk, who subsequently had moved to Minnesota, filed suit in
the state courts of his new domicile. 15 ° Because Rush appeared to have no con-
tacts with Minnesota that would support in personam jurisdiction, Savchuk
sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing Rush's automobile
liability insurance policy.' 5 ' Although the policy was issued in Indiana, plain-
tiff argued that Minnesota nevertheless could garnish the insurer's obligation
141 Id, at 298.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 299.
144 Id.
Id. at 292-93.
'" Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1980).
R? Id. at 322.
' 48 Id.
"9 Id.
"° Id. Indiana would have barred a claim by Savchuk against Rush under its guest statute.
Id. See IND. CODE S 9.3-3-1 (1973). Furthermore, by the time suit had been filed in Minnesota,
Indiana's two-year statute of limitations had run. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 496, 502 n.5, 272
N.W.2d 888, 891 n.5 (1978).
"' 444 U.S. at 322. In personam jurisdiction is based on having legal authority directly over
the defendant's person. Alternatively, jurisdiction may be predicted upon a state's legal authori-
ty over property owned by the defendant. Such a proceeding is generally known as an action in
rem, of which there are three specific .types: in rem, against all the world; quasi in rem, against
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to indemnify Rush because Rush's insurance company, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm), did business in Minnesota.'"
Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdic-
tion, arguing first that, because Rush had not yet been adjudged liable for Sav-
chuk's injuries, no garnishable debt had arisen as between State Farm and
Rush and, second, that, even if a garnishable debt did exist, an assertion of
quasi in rem jurisdiction based upon such a garnishment was contrary to con-
stitutional due process requirements.' 55 The trial judge denied the motion.'"
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the defendant's jurisdictional
arguments were again rejected.' 55 The state supreme court found that Min-
nesota law did not require that a debt be due absolutely before it may be gar-
nished,'" and that the facts of the case constitutionally supported quasi in rem
jurisdiction.'"
In deciding the constitutional issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied
on a theory developed by the New York Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth' 58 and
Simpson v. Loehmann. 159 This theory rested largely upon two legal fictions that
were at the time approved by the United States Supreme Court. The first fic-
specific persons; and quasi in rern, attachment. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL. PROCEDURE
628-29 (2d ed: 1977). Rush was brought on a theory of quasi in rem, attachment, in which the
forum state seizes property within its borders belonging to the defendant and holds it pending a
judgment. Should the plaintiff be successful, the property seized will be used to settle the claim.
Id. at 629. See also text at note 7 supra.
157 444 U.S. at 322. Such a claim of jurisdiction is based on a mixture of two theories: (1) a
corporation is deemed to be present in a state if it is doing business there, International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914), and (2) a debt, for jurisdictional purposes, is held to
be at all times with the debtor, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 224 (1905). Therefore, because
State Farm was doing business in Minnesota, any debt it may have owed to Rush was attachable
in Minnesota.
I" Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 483, 245 N.W.2d 624, 627 (1976).
" 4 Id.
L" Id. at 490, 245 N.W.2d at 630.
L" Id. at 484, 245 N.W.2d at 627. In so finding, the court relied on MINN. STAT. S 571.41
subd. 2 (1975) (repealed 1976) which stated in relevant part:
Garnishment shall be permitted before judgment in the following instances only
.. . (2) When the garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of suretyship,
guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to respond to
any person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main action,
Id. The court observed that this provision appeared to be in direct conflict with MINN, STAT.
571.43 (1975) which reads: No person or corporation shall be adjudged a garnishee by reason of
. Ialny money or other thing due to the judgment debtor, unless at the time of the service of
the summons, the same is due absolutely, and without depending on any contingency." The
court, however, found that 571.41 controls under MINN. STAT. 5 645.26 (1975), because it is
more specific in its language. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 484-85, 245 N.W.2d 624, 627
(1976). Additionally, the court concluded 5 571.41 better served judicial policies favoring the
provision of a forum to Minnesota residents and the extension of the state's jurisdiction to the
maximum limits permitted by the Constitution. Id. at 485, 245 N.W.2d at 628.
'" Id. at 487-88, 245 N.W.2d at 629.
1 " 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N,E,2d 312 (1966).
'" 21 N,Y.2d 111, 269 N. Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 669 (1967), rehearing denied, 21 N.Y.2d
990, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 238 N.E.2d 319 (1968). The focus in Seider was the legality under New
York statutes of attaching an insurance debt contingent upon the pending litigation. The con-
stitutionality of such action apparently was assumed. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100,
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tion was developed in the case of Harris v. Balk 16° in which the court held that
for purposes of jurisdiction in rem, a debt, as intangible property, travels with
the debtor.' 6 ' If a debtor was present in the forum, the debt would be there as
well, subjecting it to attachment and the creditor to quasi in rem jurisdiction.'"
The second fiction relied upon in these cases was that a corporation was present
in a forum when it was doing business there.'" In Seider and Simpson the New
York court utilized these fictions in the following manner. The court treated
the potential liability of an insurer for the tortious injury caused by the insured
as a debt owed by the insurer to the insured. 164 Consequently, under the theory
of Harris, wherever the insurer was present, the insurance proceeds could be at-
tached and the insured subjected to quasi in rem jurisdiction.'" Under the sec-
ond fiction, an insurance company was deemed to be present wherever it wrote
policies.'" Thus, an insured tortfeasor might be subject to suit wherever his in-
surance company had a policy in force. This broad jurisdictional theory was
subject only to two constitutional restrictions. First, out of considerations of
basic fairness, notice had to be given to the defendant,'" and second, to ensure
that the forum had a genuine interest in the adjudication, the plaintiff had to be
a domiciliary of the forum. In applying this approach to the facts in Rush, the
Minnesota court found (1) that the insurer and therefore the debt, were present
in the state, (2) that the defendant received adequate notice, and (3) that the
plaintiff was a resident of Minnesota. Therefore, the court affirmed the ruling
of the trial court that grounds for jurisdiction existed.' 69
216 N.E.2d at 313. In Simpson, a case involving facts similar to Seider, the defendant directly at-
tacked the Seider rule on due process grounds. 21 N.Y.2d at 308, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35, 234
N.E.2d at 670. Therefore, it is in Simpson that the New York Court of Appeals first addressed the
constitutionality of a Seider attachment.
160 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
161 Id. at 224.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1933).
164 Simpsonv. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636, 234 N.E.2d 669,
671 (1967); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 209 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314
(1966).
165 See cases cited in note 164 supra.
166 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637, 234 N.E.2d at 672;
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 102, 216 N.E.2d at 314.
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 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 309, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 635, 234 N.E.2d at 670. See
generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 307 (1950).
168 See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637, 234 N.E.2d at 672.
See also Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 1968) (interpreting New York law),
aff'd on rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). This final re-
quirement is derived from the contacts test of International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319-20 (1945). The plaintiffs' residence in the forum along with the fact that the garnishee-
insurer was present and regulated by the forum was viewed as creating sufficient contact between
the controversy to make the exercise of jurisdiction fair. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,
311, 287 N. Y.S. 633, 637, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1967). International Shoe, however, stressed the
need for contacts between the defendant and the forum, 326 U.S. at 316, not just for contacts
between the litigation and the forum. See Casenote, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 147, 150-51
(1966).
169 Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 490, 245 N.W.2d 624, 630 (1976).
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When the case first came to the Supreme Court of the United States on ap-
peal, the judgment of the Minnesota high court was vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of the Court's recent decision in Shaffer v.
Heitrzer.' 7° Rush had been decided on the assumption that the mere presence of a
defendant's property in a state was enough to support quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Shaffer, of course, held that all personal jurisdiction cases must be decided by
reference to the minimum contacts rule."' Although the presence of property
owned by the defendant in a forum might in some instances provide minimum
contacts, in situations where the property was wholly unrelated to the cause of
action and was "present" in the state only on the basis of a legal fiction, that
property could not serve as a contact permitting jurisdiction.' 72
 in Shaffer the
Court was especially critical of Harris v. Balk, in which jurisdiction had been
sustained even though the property seized was both unrelated to the suit and
present in the forum solely by virtue of a legal fiction. 173 Indeed, to the extent
Harris was inconsistent with Shaffer it was expressly overruled.'" In relying on
Seider and Simpson, the Minnesota court indirectly rested its holding on
Harris."s As a result, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
Minnesota court erred in its reasoning and that the case should be remanded to
give the Minnesota court an opportunity to develop a rationale consistent with
Shaffer.
On rernand the Supreme Court of Minnesota reinstated its earlier judg-
r ient, holding that the facts of Rush were distinguishable from those of Shaffer
and Harris and that they supported quasi in rem jurisdiction.' 76
 The court found
17° See Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
" 3 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 198, 212 (1977).
"2 Id. at 208-09.
1 " Id.
' 7 + Id. at 212 n.39. In Harris, a resident of Maryland, Epstein, had a claim against Balk, a
North Carolina resident. 198 U.S. at 216. Harris, also a North Carolina resident, owed money
to Balk, so when Harris happened to visit Maryland, Epstein attached Harris' debt to Balk. Id.
As a result, Harris paid to Epstein the amount of his indebtedness to Balk. Id. at 217. When Balk
subsequently sued Harris for default, the Supreme Court held that a debt travels with the debtor
so that when Harris went to Maryland the debt went too. Id. at 221.22. Thus Harris' payment to
Epstein represented a discharge of Balk's debt to Epstein and Harris's debt to Balk. Id. at 222.
In Shaffer the plaintiff sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction in Delaware over the directors
and officers of a Delaware corporation by sequestering their stock. 433 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1977).
Under Delaware law, stock of a Delaware corporation, even if not physically in the state, is
deemed to be legally present in the state and subject to seizure. Id. at 192 (citing DEL. CODE tit.
8, S 169 (1975)). Here the Supreme Court held that although the defendants voluntarily had
become officers, directors, and shareholders of a Delaware corporation, and although the suit in-
volved the defendants' management of that corporation, Delaware's sequestation statute was in-
sufficient to establish minimum ties between defendant, forum, and litigation. 433 U.S. at
213-17. Clearly, the forum's contacts with the defendants and litigation are far stronger in Shaffer
than in Harris where Balk's only relation with Maryland was the presence of his debtor, Harris,
in that state, a circumstance over which he had no control. It is obviously unquestionable that
Shaffer is indistinguishable from Harris, and, therefore, equally obvious that Shaffer completely
overrules Harris,
175 See text and notes at notes 159-65 supra,
"6 See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 496, 502-03, 505, 272 N.W.2d 888, 891-92, 893
(1978).
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the defendant's purchase of automobile insurance from State Farm to be an
adequate contact to support jurisdiction under International Shoe. The court
based this conclusion on three factors. First, the plaintiff was a resident of the
forum.'" Second, the insurance obligation garnished was related directly to,
indeed contigent upon, the substantive controversy."B Third, the action was
the functional equivalent of a direct in personam action against an insurance
company that was present in Minnesota. 19
 The first two factors, the court
reasoned, demonstrated the state's clear interest in adjudication of the suit; the
third factor showed that the defendant was not significantly inconvenienced by
the plaintiff's choice of Minnesota as a forum.'"
In assessing the overall fairness of asserting jurisdiction, the court relied
on all three factors, but it placed greatest emphasis on the last one. The court
viewed the suit as a direct action for two reasons. First, under the terms of the
insurance policy State Farm had complete control over the course of the litiga-
tion. Second, because it was a quasi in rem action, Rush's liability was limited to
the face value of the policy, in effect making State Farm the only liable party.
Since State Farm was in control of the defense and the only party at risk, the
court viewed it as the actual defendant and Rush as merely a nominal defend-
ant."' By viewing State Farm as the real defendant, the court transformed the
case into an in personam action against a corporation that was actively doing
business in Minnesota and, therefore, clearly subject to suit there. Thus, even
though Rush's contact with Minnesota was tenuous, it was fair to maintain this
action because the inconvenience to him as a result of the suit was also slight.
When the case returned to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
Justices in a 7-2 decision"' held that jurisdiction could not be supported
because the defendant, Rush, had not taken any action that reasonably should
have caused him to expect that he would be subject to suit in Minnesota.'" The
Court rejected the argument that the defendant's dealings with an insurer
doing business in Minnesota might create such an expectation, and as in
World-Wide, it did so without weighing the factors traditionally balanced to
determine overall fairness of the forum's jurisdictional claim.'"
177 Id. at 502-03, 272 N.W.2d at 891-92.
178 Id. at 502, 272 N.W.2d at 891.
179 Id, at 504-05, 272 N.W.2d at 892-93.
"° Id. at 502-03, 505, 272 N.W.2d at 891, 893.
' 1 ' Id. at 504, 272 N.W.2d at 892. Although the court does not cite it, this direct action ra-
tionale was employed in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd an rehearing
en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Minichiello is cited in Savchuk v.
Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 485, 489, 245 N.W.2d 624, 628, 630 (1976), but not for its direct action
argument.
I" The opinion of the court was delivered by Justice Marshall, and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens
dissented. Justice Brennan expressed his disapproval of the disposition of this case in his dissent
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
'" Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1980). See generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
'" Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980).
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The Court rejected all three factors favoring jurisdiction put forth by the
Minnesota court. 185 It concluded that the Minnesota court's attempt to derive
jurisdictional contacts from the plaintiff's residence in the state at the time of
trial was intolerable because it made a "subtle shift in focus" from contacts
between the defendant and the forum, as required by International Shoe and Shaf-
fer, to contacts between the plaintiff and forum.'" The Court declared that a
defendant's due process rights may not be determined through an examination
of a plaintiff's status.'" The Court acknowledged that plaintiff's contact with
the forum was one of the factors that might have been weighed in determining
the overall fairness of jurisdiction once a minimum contact had been estab-
lished, but in Rush this issue never was reached because no contact between
forum and defendant was established.'"
Turning to the presence in Minnesota of the inchoate debt owed to the
defendant under his insurance policy, the Court found that this contact suf-
fered from two fatal flaws, both of which were described in Shaffer v. Heitner. 1"
First, the debt was wholly unrelated to the cause of action, and second, it was
merely "present" in the forum state because of a legal fiction. The latter point
was conceded by the Minnesota court,'°° and therefore, was not discussed in
detail by the Justices. The first point, however, was in direct conflict with the
conclusion of the court below. The state court specifically had distinguished
Rush from Shaffer on the ground that the debt garnished in Rush was tied closely
to the litigation. 19 ' The Supreme Court, however, held that the Minnesota
court had misconstrued the Shaffer opinion when it found that there was an ade-
quate relationship between the property garnished and the cause of action.' 92
Shaffer, the Court declared, requires that property attached in an in rem action
pertain to the substance of the dispute, not that it merely stand as the potential
spoils of victory.'" For example, attachment of property to which both the
defendant and plaintiff claim title would support jurisdiction. Likewise, the
presence of an absentee defendant's property may sustain jurisdiction where
the suit arises out of an injury caused by that property. The insurance carried
by the defendant, however, had no such relationship to the substantive ques-
tion whether the defendant was liable in tort for plaintiff's alleged injuries.'" It
merely represented the source from which a judgment against the defendant
would be paid. Thus, the potential debt the insurance company owed to the
defendant could not be a source of jurisdictional power over the defendant.
Finally, the Court held that the suit may not be saved by treating it as the
functional equivalent of a direct action against the insurer.'" The Court noted
1 " Id.
'es Id. at 332.
lin Id.
188
 Id.
"9 Id. at 328-29.
19° See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 496, 503, 272 N.W.2d 888, 892 (1978).
191 Id. at 502-03, 272 N.W.2d at 891-92.
192 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 302, 328-29 (1980).
193 Id
194
 Id. at 329.
'93 Id. at 330.
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that the scheme established by Minnesota required that the state have jurisdic-
tional power over the insured before the insurer can be drawn into the
action.' 96 Therefore, because Minnesota did not have the necessary contacts
with the insured to exercise constitutionally judicial jurisdiction over him, there
was no basis in Minnesota law for asserting jurisdiction over his insurer. 197 The
Court flatly rejected the argument that because liability was limited to the
policy amount, the insured was only a "nominal defendant." Even if this was
the substantive effect of the action, the Court stated, on a procedural level
"Nile State's ability to exert its power over the 'nominal defendant' is
analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the case as a garnishee.' " 9 °
Thus, as in World-Wide, the Supreme Court, without fully examining the
fairness of jurisdiction, rebuffed the state court's attempt to exercise power
over an out-of-state defandant by holding that the defendant had performed no
act calculated to affect any interest of the forum.
B. Constricting State Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Defendants
The decisions of World- Wide and Rush delineate a shift in the Court's ap-
proach to jurisdictional questions under the minimum contacts rule. Previous-
ly, jurisdiction could be sustained where the defendant acted in a fashion that
had an impact on the forum. 199 If the impact was slight or very indirect,
jurisdiction nevertheless could be supported if it was fair to do so. 20° Fairness
was measured by balancing the interests of the forum and the plaintiff in allow-
ing jurisdiction against any hardship imposed upon the defendant by having to
go to trial in a foreign state. 20 ' As a result of World-Wide and Rush, however,
jurisdiction now can be sustained only where the defendant's effect on a state's
interests is clear and direct. 202 If this prerequisite is not met, jurisdiction must
be denied even where its exercise would be completely fair. 203 This seemingly
inequitable result, the Court said in World-Wide, is necessary to keep the exer-
cise of judicial power in one state from encroaching upon the power of
other states . 2°4
The holdings in World- Wide and Rush undeniably succeed in restricting
state court jurisdiction, but it is not clear that they do so in a beneficial manner.
First, it is doubtful that the decisions in World-Wide and Rush will make juris-
dictional decisions any more predictable. Second, they are likely to produce oc-
casionally results that are unjust to plaintiffs or that are judicially inefficient.
Prior to World-Wide and Rush, a contact was evaluated in absolute terms.
Either the defendant did or did not have some contact, however slight, with the
forum. If a contact existed, jurisdiction was decided on the basis of whether or
196
 Id. at 330-31.
'" Id. at 331.
'go Id. at 330-31.
190 See text at notes 30-32 supra.
200 See text at note 40 supra.
201 See text at note 41 supra.
202 See text at notes 129.31 supra.
203 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
204
 Id. at 293.
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not it was fair. 203 Under World- Wide and Rush, the existence of a contact in the
absolute sense is not sufficient to allow a court to proceed to the issue of
fairness. A qualitative judgment about the contact must also be made. The
court must decide whether the contact was direct and definite enough to have
provided the defendant with notice that his actions were affecting the interests
of the forum. 206 In some instances, however, there may not be a principled
basii for•making such a judgment.
For example, in World- Wide the defendants had a contact with the forum
in an absolute sense because they sold cars that they could have reasonably for-
seen would travel to the forum and because one such car caused injury in the
forum."' Under the old contacts approach this contact would be sufficient to
allow the court to settle the jurisdiction question by examining the fairness of
the forum. Under the new approach an additional hurdle was interposed before
the Court could reach the fairness question. The Court had to decide whether
the defendants knew that their car sales in New York would have a direct im-
pact in Oklahoma."' Intuitively the answer to this question is no, but the ques-
tion becomes more difficult when the states are in greater proximity. Is a car
dealer subject to jurisdiction in states immediately surrounding his domicile?
At what point did the plaintiffs in World- Wide, as they traveled from New York
to Arizona, cease to be able to sue in the state through which they were then
traveling? These questions are left unanswered in World- Wide and because of
their subjective nature they are questions that are not likely to be resolved in a
consistent and predictable manner in each of the fifty state-court systems.
Similarly, in Rush an absolute contact existed because the defendant's in-
surer did business in the forum."' Under the old approach this left the court to
determine whether such a slender connection between defendant and forum
fairly permitted jurisdiction.") Under the new rule, however, it first has to
decide whether the defendant should have recognized that his purchase of in-
surance would affect the interests of Minnesota. 2 " At first glance the answer
clearly appears to be negative, but such a result may be inconsistent with the
Court's approach to direct actions against insurers because the effect of allow-
ing jurisdiction in Rush is virtually indistinguishable from the effect of a direct
action. 212 Nevertheless, the Court denied jurisdiction in Rush, even though it
found no constitutional impediment to direct actions. 213 Consequently, the
Court appears to be sanctioning a form over substance approach to jurisdic-
tion. This result, like the one in World- Wide, does not lend itself to either order
or predictability.
2 °3 See text at notes 30-32 supra.
206 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297; Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. at 332-33.
207 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
205 Id. at 297.
200 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980).
210 See text at note 32 supra.
2l1
	 text at note 188 supra.
212 See Rush v. Savchuk 444 U.S. 320, 333-34 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 330-31.
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A second problem posed by World-Wide and Rush is the danger that some
plaintiffs will be left without a practical forum to pursue their claims. Persons
with relatively limited resources may not be able to afford the costs of bringing
a claim in a distant forum. Furthermore, where there are multiple defendants,
denial of jurisdiction in the one possible common forum may force the plaintiff
to bring multiple suits or to forego the claim. Such results are illogical where
the inconvenience to the defendant of having to litigate in the plaintiff's chosen
forum is slight or nonexistant.
For example, in World-Wide, by denying jurisdiction in Oklahoma the
Court left the plaintiffs only the New York courts in which to bring their claim.
No other state had contacts with the subject matter of the litigation and the
defendant. Moreover, the federal courts had refused to hear the case because
there was no diversity of citizenship. The plaintiffs, because they had not
established a new domicile after leaving New York, were deemed to be, like the
defendants, domiciliaries of New York. 214 If the cost of transporting witnesses
and evidence to New York for trial was high, the plaintiffs might be forced to
drop their claim. Where the relative cost to the defendant of having to litigate
in Oklahoma is minimal, this result appears to be unjust.
Similar problems might arise in a case like Shaffer. The logical place to sue
all of the officers and directors of a DelaiNare corporation is in Delaware.
Because the defendants in such a suit probably have different domiciles, there
may be no other common forum. If the plaintiff was forced to sue the defend-
ants individually in their respective domiciles, the cost and inconvenience of
multiple litigations might force the plaintiff to abandon his effort. Although, as
in Shaffer, such considerations may not always tip the balance in favor of
jurisdiction, they are at least factors that should be examined.
Additionally, in a case with multiple defendants, if the plaintiff is unable
to bring a single action and decides to pursue suits in each defendant's
domicile, several problems arise. First, such a course represents a significant
waste of judicial resources. Several judges and courtrooms are tied up where
one should be sufficient. This presents considerable expense to the parties and
the public, and may pose significant logistical problems as witnesses and
evidence criss-cross the country from trial to trial. Furthermore, there is the
possibility of different courts reaching different results. This may occur because
of different choices of law, different interpretations of the same law, or different
findings of fact. Whatever the reason, divergent results do not further justice.
Admittedly, to counterbalance these evils, there lies on the other side of
the equation the problem of forum shopping. Inevitably, where there are a
number of forums for the plaintiff to chose from, the case will be heard in the
one least favorable to the defendant. Thus, liberal jurisdiction rules give plain-
tiffs a significant advantage. One response to this problem is to reduce the
number of forums by requiring stronger contacts between the defendant and
the forum. This was the approach of World-Wide and Rush. As noted above,
however, this approach has serious drawbacks because it focuses only on the
214 Brief for Respondent at 3, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980).
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problem of forum shopping and ignores other legitimate jurisdictional con-
cerns.
Another way to reduce the number of forums is to require fairer forums.
Rather than circumventing the balancing test weighing all factors, it would be
better to re-evaluate the relative importance of the factors that are balanced. If
the danger of forum shopping has not been addressed adequately in the past,
courts should give it greater weight in determining whether jurisdiction is fair
in the future. 215 Such a factor, however, should not be given, as they were in
World- Wide and Rush, the power to preempt all other considerations. The
dangers inherent in giving a factor too much weight are the same as the
dangers of giving a factor insufficient consideration.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is properly concerned with the potential dangers of
excessively permissive and haphazard rules of state jurisdiction. In its effort to
control this problem in World-Wide and Rush, however, the Court appears to
have embarked on a course that will not always produce just and predictable
results. By making it more difficult to.reach issues concerning the fairness and
reasonableness of jurisdiction, the Court has made it less likely that a decision
will be fair and reasonable.
ROBERT W. BUCK
115 A third alternative for solving the forum shopping problem might be the enforcement of
narrower choice of law rules through either the due process clause or the full faith and credit
clause.
